Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Working Paper:

Suggested elements for final document language on Article III of the NPT

1. The Conference recalls the generally positive assessment of the Third Review Conference of the implementation of Article III, and notes that the recommendations of that Conference for the future implementation of that Article provided a helpful basis for States Party to the Treaty and the IAEA to strengthen further the barriers to proliferation and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings.

2. The Conference affirms its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to additional States. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the NPT and full compliance with its provisions is the best way to achieve this goal and they urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it.

3. The Conference expresses the conviction that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings under Article III and assist States in demonstrating this compliance. IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Unsafeguarded nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States still pose serious proliferation dangers. The Conference reiterates the calls for the continued pursuit of the principle of universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States.

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4. The Conference notes with satisfaction that since the Last Review Conference, the IAEA has again, in carrying out its safeguards activities, not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown.

5. The Conference notes that IAEA safeguards activities have not hampered the peaceful nuclear development of the Parties to the Treaty but have furthered international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

6. The Conference commends the IAEA on its implementation of safeguards pursuant to this Treaty. It notes continued improvements in safeguards cost effectiveness and efficiency and urges this to be maintained inter alia by utilizing new cost efficient technologies and methodologies. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining a staff of the highest professional standard with due regard to the widest geographical distribution possible.

7. The Conference notes the request of the Director General of the IAEA for States to facilitate the designation of inspectors, and calls on States to respond as fully as possible so as to maximize the efficient use of Agency inspection resources.

8. The Conference calls upon all States to take IAEA safeguards requirements into account while planning, designing and constructing new nuclear facilities and while modifying existing ones.

9. The Conference recognizes that there are other items including tritium which are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the NPT as a whole. The Conference calls for co-ordinated steps to ensure appropriate non-proliferation arrangements to apply to such items.

10. The Conference recognizes the importance of State systems of accounting and control to the efficient and effective application of safeguards, and urges continued improvements in this area including with the valuable assistance of IAEA and national programs of training in such systems. It also notes in this regard the complementary and important role of national export and import control mechanisms.

11. The Conference calls upon States Party to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in order to ensure that the IAEA is able to meet its international legal obligations pursuant to safeguards agreements under the Treaty, and its increasing safeguards responsibilities. It notes the importance of continued assured

regular budget financing to permit the IAEA to meet its growing commitments in this area, and welcomes efforts by members of the IAEA to find a lasting and equitable solution to the question of a safeguards financing formula.

12. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which resulted from a recommendation of the first NPT Review Conference. The Conference notes that membership of the Convention has increased to 28. The Conference urges all States that have not done so to adhere to the Convention at the earliest possible date.

13. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear weapon systems and materials.

14. The Conference recognizes the non-proliferation benefits of the conversion of research reactors from high enriched to low enriched fuel. It welcomes continuing international co-operation in the introduction of such conversions.

15. The Conference recognizes the particular requirements for safeguards and physical protection of direct use nuclear material and notes the amounts of separated plutonium intended for peaceful purposes are expected to increase significantly in the 1990s. The Conference expressed satisfaction at the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing and the storage and use of separated plutonium.

16. The Conference recalls the recommendations at the Third Review Conference on the implementation of article XII.A.5 of the Statute of the IAEA, and calls on the IAEA to consider studying the need to arrange for deposit with the Agency, as foreseen in its Statute, of any excess of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product over what is needed in order to prevent stock-piling of materials that could be diverted to direct use for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. In this context, the question of highly enriched uranium stocks resulting from the conversion of research reactor fuel to low enrichment might also be considered further in that study.